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Czechoslovakia E 51

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What is much more serious is that the Czech areas are losing
population to the profit of the German sections. (In Moravia it is completely the contrary). In 1890 33.46% of the Czechs in Bohemia were living in German areas; in 1900 there were already 34.61% of them. During this ten year period the birth rate in the German sections was 8.1% for the Germans, and only 4.8% among the Czechs of the Czech sections. These phenomena are explained by the importance of German industry which attracts the Czechs into the German areas.

S.P.
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Already the Germans--at least /125/ the sensible ones--recognize that it is impossible to Germanize the Czechs. The chauvinists alone still dared to hope for it, especially those who consider Bohemia as a lock which one can burst asunder in order to open to the German race an access to the Adriatic. But they are fooling themselves, as are those who believe that the Poles of the Kingdom of Prussia can be denationalized.

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The situation of the Slovaks in Hungary is not nearly so good; they are deprived of all political rights and, following the example of what is happening in Prussia, they are being threatened with expropriation. Nevertheless, they continue to stand against the Magyars within their ancient boundaries, they give way only very slightly within these boundaries, and, were it not for the Magyarization which is being energetically imposed upon the nation, especially upon the upper classes, and for a rather considerable emigration, the people would be able to hold their own, all the more since they are constantly assimilating Polish and Russian elements in the north and east of their territory.

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When in 1900 I drew up my ethnographic map for the Slovaks, the Russians protested against the figures which the statistics showed to their detriment. It has been demonstrated that the progress of the Slovaks had not been as rapid as I had thought, but it exists nevertheless. All of eastern Slovakia is nothing but Russia which has been Slovakized, and this assimilation is continuing.

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/126/ S 24. Differentiation.--The primitive differentiation of the tribes has left no important trace among the Czechs. All of the shades of difference have been leveled off by time and those which relate to the physical aspects, to the languages, to costume in these latter days, have almost entirely disappeared.

have almost entirely disappeared. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, modern civilization, the school, the obligatory military service, and similar factors have unified them more and more. It is only in Moravia that there still is some slight variety, but it will disappear even there.

Three principal dialects are recognized in Bohemia: those of the southwest, of the center, and of the northeast. But they do not afford accentuated characteristics which render them immediately recognizable. In contrast, here and there ethnographic islands are met with, which, from the point of view of language and of costume afford special interest and are distinguished by particular names. Thus, not so long ago in the west the area of Plzen and in the east that of Litomysl with the dialect of Orlice had a special physiognomy.

Likewise in the southeast the Blataki (from Blato, swamp, lake, in the area located between Sobieslav* and Trebon*) can be distinguished, and in the region southwest of the Sumava, the Chodes*, the most typical of all of the Czech tribes (1), which were /127/

1. A few notes on the Chodes will be found in my volume, *Le Monde slave* (2d edition, Paris, 1897, p. 200). Translator. formerly settled between Domazlice and Tachov, and which are now concentrated around Domazlice, the Tachov area having been partly Germanized. It is in the area of Mount Rip that the true type of Czech peasant is to be found.

The odd character of the Chodes has given rise to the most diverse theories regarding their origin. Formerly Paul Stransky*, and later Ruffer, Erben, Grabowski, suggested that they were Poles settled as colonists by Bretislav I. But their dialect offers not the slightest trace of Polish influence. The uniqueness of the Chodes is explained sufficiently by the mountainous and isolated region which they occupy, by their traditions and the privileges which they have enjoyed since the fourteenth century as guardians of the frontiers.

The originality of the primitive tribes is better preserved in Moravia. There we may very easily distinguish three different types, not only by dialect, but by physical and ethnographic details, particularly by the costume; even more, the people themselves are conscious of these differences and glad to affirm them. Up until now the things which have been most clearly recognized are the

The Primitive Slavs

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uity depended upon itinerant merchants and traders following strategic watercourses. Even far to the eastward, when the Goths invaded south Russian territory, they maintained the same commercial relations with the Roman Empire which had been established earlier by German settlements along its frontier further westward. Caches of Roman coins, dating chiefly from the interval between Trajan and Septimius Severus (98-198 A.D.), which have been found in great profusion on the west bank of the middle Dnieper, show a remarkable expansion of trade with the Roman west in this area during the second and third centuries, hence under the Gothic hegemony and prior to the Slavic dispersion. Once the Goths had entered into relations with Byzantium and the Greek cities on the Black Sea, their interest in trade with the western Roman Empire waned, and from that point the Dnieprian Slavs largely received products of the so-called Gothic type from the barbarized Pontic workshops. As long as the Goths lived among the Slavs, they exercised a direct economic influence upon them, but once they had withdrawn to the coast of the Black Sea after the fall of Ermanaric before the Huns in 370, they ceased to be a significant commercial factor. Even when Byzantine trade set in during the fifth century, its volume was so restricted that from this point to the eighth century there is actually an interval in which the economic relations of the Dnieper valley with the rest of the early medieval world were in abeyance. 439
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This interval coincides with the epoch of large-scale Slavic migration and dispersion. Its conclusion is marked in turn by the stabilization of the Slavs on the Elbe, on the Danube, and in the Balkans; by the temporary elimination of nomadic invaders from the steppes, the economic advance of the Carolingian period, the beginnings of the Viking Age in Scandinavia, and the establishment of Arab control over Oriental commerce. The period from 700 to 1000, though also initiating the gradual withdrawal of the Western Slavs from the Elbe frontier under German pressure, also saw the evolution of all the medieval Slavic states and their advance to the level of 167
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178 contemporary material and intellectual culture which culmi-
 439 nates in their conversion to Christianity under Roman or
 Byzantine auspices. It likewise witnessed an expansion of trade
 both in Central Europe and in the Orient, and in this com-
 mercial expansion the Slavs in general had a definite stake.

764 Though a combined evaluation of linguistic, source, and
 archaeological data permits a tolerably accurate and convinc-
 ing appraisal of the material culture of the Slavs during the
 pagan period, there is no such coherent mass of evidence upon
 which any wholly satisfactory statement of their religious be-
 liefs, demonology, and eschatology may be predicted. The early
 Slavs cremated their dead, sharing this custom with their other
 Indo-European neighbors (Lithuanians, Germans, Celts). Bur-
 ial was adopted through foreign influence, and before the
 various conversions both customs existed side by side. The
 774 primitive pagan Slavs were animists and attributed a soul to
 776 the natural elements in which they lived. They honored a su-
 775 preme deity and also believed in the existence of wood, water,
 [782] and household spirits to which they offered sacrifices. Beside
 these nature spirits, they also honored the spirits of their an-
 cestors and thus believed in a future life. They deified the
 821 heavenly bodies and the great phenomena of nature (thunder,
 lightning, wind, rain, fire).

776 Beside these animistic and manistic beliefs, the pagan Slavs
 also venerated a limited number of gods, some of which were
 of alien origin. The organization of a veritable pantheon was
 carried farthest by the Western Slavs who lived along the Baltic
 coast, a phenomenon perhaps not unconnected with Germanic
 influences of early date. It is reasonably clear that all the
 primitive Slavs possessed a god of the thunder and lightning,
 though this deity, Perun, took on special importance among
 the Russian Slavs because of special Scandinavian influences
 and the importance of Thor in the Scandinavian pantheon.
 Among the Western Slavs, however, Perun was less dominant
 than the god of the shining sun, Svarog, a name apparently con-
 nected with the indo-European base *suar, signifying "heat,

²[THE PERIOD FROM 700 TO 1000 A.D. -- ANALYST]

The Slavic Migrations

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into genuine trading posts and towns, the importance of which was enhanced by the penetration of foreign merchants at the beginning of the historical period. The rise of trading posts and towns gradually concentrated adjacent agricultural areas under the control of the former, producing at the same time accumulations of wealth in the hands of a new ruling class which appropriated to itself the influence formerly wielded by the elders of family, clan, and tribe. The growing prestige of the towns also broke down the various tribal differentiations, since portions of the same tribal area might fall for reasons of geography and communication under the control of different towns.

In general, the Russian tribes formed three groups distinguishable by their speech, which are reflected in our day by the tripartite division of the Russian language into three basic dialects. The northern group, comprising the Slovenes (Slavs) of Novgorod and the Krivichians, is the forerunner of the modern Great Russian dialect, the standard literary language. The central group, including Dregovichians, Radimichians, Vyatichians, and Severians, divided into two sections, of which the eastern joined the northern, or ultimately Great Russian element, while the western section (Dregovichians, Radimichians) came to form the White Russian element centering around Minsk. The southern group, made up of Polyane, Derevlans, Volhynians, Ulichians, Tivercians, and Croats, evolved into the Little Russian or Ukrainian element. In fact, the term *Ukraina* goes back as far as at least 1187, and means the southern border district. The differences among these three dialects have of course been intensified as time went on by the accidents of political affiliation and by diversified cultural influences. But these three groups are none the less parts of the same nation, so that either a White Russian or a Ukrainian is precisely as much a Russian as the purest Great Russian born in the shadow of the Kremlin.

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III

Conversion and Religious Divisions

175* While conversion to Christianity was an inevitable phase of
186 the process by which the Slavs were drawn into the general
797 movement of European civilization, it was by no means an
unmixed blessing. When Slavic tribes had evolved to some
semblance of national consciousness and even statehood, or
were sufficiently remote from the center where religious in-
fluence was exempt from political pressure, they were able to
retain their independence and to follow a characteristic course
of development. But if they lived on the periphery of a power-
ful and aggressive Christian state, their political independence
was frequently threatened, and if this state cherished colonial
aims, the convert Slavs were very likely to face the choice be-
tween assimilation and enslavement, or, at the very worst, com-
plete extermination.

797 The section of the medieval church which brought about the
795 conversion was also a factor of durable historical weight. The
• 178 Western Church was devoted to the tradition of Latin culture.
779 It insisted on the celebration of the Mass in the hallowed
197 language of the Church. Hence it evinced little concern for the
175* creation of any vernacular culture. Though not possessed of
the same vitality, the Eastern Church soon found that it could
evangelize the various pagans on the long Byzantine frontier
more effectively if it allowed them to use their native languages

Conversion and Religious Divisions 53

in the service. Hence, though much of early south or east Slavic literature is either translated or imitated, the fact remains that the Slavs under Byzantine intellectual and religious influence developed significant national cultures much more rapidly than those under the domination of Rome. That these cultures, after a brilliant initial spurt, were later retarded and even brought to a halt which lasted several centuries is due, not to the source of conversion itself, but to historical accidents which supervened after conversion took place. Had not the Eastern and the Southern Slavs fallen victims, in one case to Tartar invasion and in the other to Turkish conquest, their intellectual lag in comparison with the rest of Europe would not have been so great. The Russians, for example, were completely deprived of all Western stimulation after the middle of the thirteenth century and nearly three hundred years elapsed before they entered upon the difficult process of assimilating the Western culture which had developed during that long and critical interval. The South Slavs, on the other hand, shook off the Turkish yoke only within the last century and thus were even more handicapped than the Russians in their struggle to catch up with the modern world.

Of all the Slavs, the Slovenes in Carinthia and Carniola were the first to encounter missionary activities. Early in the seventh century, they had been temporarily combined with Czechs and Sorbs north of the Danube in the semilegendary kingdom under Samo, who led them victoriously against the Avars and simultaneously offered a temporary barrier to Frankish expansion southward. During his declining years in Switzerland, Saint Columban, the great Irish missionary, had thought, as early as 612, of setting out from Bregenz on a mission to the nearest Slavs, but, finding the task too difficult for his advanced age (he was already sixty-nine), he retired to Italy and ended his days at Bobbio.

After Samo disappeared from the scene and his realm was dissolved, the Slovenes were unable to withstand the Avars, who soon held the Danube as far as the Enns. The Slovenes

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Foundations of Russian Culture

175* Russia makes a relatively late appearance on the stage of
177 European civilization. A specifically Russian culture does not even begin until nearly 1000 A.D. with the conversion of Prince Vladimir I of Kiev in 989. In Western Europe, since the fall of the Roman Empire, a new civilization had by that time evolved from a fusion of Christian ideals with the survivals of classical culture. But medieval Russia derived its faith from Byzantium and from the Eastern branch of the church in which purely Latin culture played a subordinate role, since the dominant elements of Byzantine civilization were Hellenistic and oriental. The tradition of classical Latin culture, the influence of which never died out in Western Europe, was but one of the intellectual factors to which Russia was not exposed until its contact with the West was intensified by Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

● 178 Another vital agent in Western civilization which never
814 touched Russia directly was the complex of humanistic and renaissance ideals both in life and in literature. During the fourteenth century when the rising tide of humanism in Western Europe had revived the study of philosophy, politics, and science on the basis of classical sources, and when a fresh aesthetic pleasure was found not only in the imitation and the study of the ancients but also in the creation of new and popu-

Foundations of Russian Culture

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lar forms in vernacular letters, Russia was just recovering from ¹⁷⁸ the economically destructive and intellectually paralyzing ef- ⁸¹⁴ fects of the Tartar conquest which had weighed the nation down since 1240. Medieval Moscow had nothing of the thirst for knowledge and the ambition for culture that inspired the foundation of German universities during the last half of the fourteenth century. It lacked the close contacts with Italy of the sixteenth which meant for Western Europe the infusion of art into literature and bore fruit in France in the works of Ronsard and the Pléiade or in England in the brilliance of Spenser and Sidney. This heritage was transmitted to Russia ^[177] only in the eighteenth century as an element in the literary models and traditions then taken over bodily from the West.

Apart from the classical tradition of the Middle Ages and the ⁷⁷⁹ revival of intellectual and artistic creative fervor during the ¹⁷⁸ Renaissance, there was a third important element in Western culture to which Russia was not directly exposed: the spirit of the Protestant Reformation. Russia had received the Christian faith from Byzantium. But the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Roman Catholic Churches were split by the schism of 1054, sixty-five years after the conversion of Kiev. The Eastern Church intensified its emphasis on mysticism and asceticism without the balance of social and cultural interests which fertilized the labors of the Roman Church in Western Europe. Then, after the contacts between the Russian Church and Constantinople became difficult because of precarious communication, and still more after the fall of the Byzantine Empire fifty years before Columbus discovered America, the church in Russia became petrified in dogma and sunk in debased formalism. It maintained no such tradition of learning, no such cult of scholastic philosophy as made the Roman Church a nucleus of productive thought even in those periods of European political history in which popular culture was at its lowest ebb. It was incapable of producing such bold and independent thinkers as a Wyclif, a Hus, a Luther, or a Calvin. Indeed, had such thinkers arisen, it is doubtful whether, even in the church or

- 178 among the limited section of the upper class which was literate,
779 there could have been found a receptive public in whom their ideas could have taken root.

178 Thus, when the Byzantine intellectual influence (such as it was) died away, the Russian Church lost its function as a repository of culture, and never regained it before it was reduced to social impotence in our own day by revolutionaries angered at its pernicious coöperation with the autocracy. Nor had there ever arisen in Russia any fruitful movement of inspired protest on theological grounds which opposed the spirit of individual critical intelligence to the inertia of a dogma-ridden hierarchy. All three of these crucial factors in the formation of the Western European outlook (the perpetuation of classical culture in the Middle Ages; humanism and the Renaissance; the Protestant Reformation) fall quite outside the purview of Russian intellectual life until introduced as contributing elements of the Western culture imposed upon Russia by Peter and his successors in the course of the eighteenth century.

- 175 * When the Swedish warrior-merchants moved down the Russian watercourses, they established themselves as the economic and military ruling class in the small towns which the Eastern Slavs themselves had founded at strategic points for trade and defense. The impulse which first unified the Eastern Slavs into what eventually became the principality of Kiev resulted from the Varangian immigration, and though the immigrants were rapidly Russified by intermarriage with the native Slavs, the princes of Kiev still maintained intimate contact with Scandinavia. At the same time, their economic needs kept them in close relations with the Byzantine Empire for a century before the conversion of Kiev and for two centuries and a half thereafter.

177 Although Byzantine culture had its weaker aspects, we are
643 too prone to underestimate its level and its service to the world, since nearly five centuries separate us from its collapse before the onslaught of the Turks. For while Western Europe was going through the painful process of civilizing the Germanic

Foundations of Russian Culture

113

pean campaigns were inoculated with the republican ideas disseminated by the French revolution. Essentially patriotic, they were eager to apply these ideals to their own country, to abolish the autocracy, promote republican government, raise the standard of education, and do away with the abuses of serfdom. They continued with greater energy, though often with little judgment, the task begun by Radishchev.

Here the Russian revolutionary movement begins among an enlightened fraction of the ruling class. Great writers like Pushkin and Lermontov, each after brief romantic digressions, grew up to treat the seamy side of reality, both in the tragedy of the humble who are scarcely considered human by those they serve, or the misfortune of the gifted individual denied a chance at productive activity by the contemporary organization of society. Both these talents were suspected and harassed by the autocracy, and though each met his death in a duel, they were as truly victims of official conservatism as those young enthusiasts who had participated in the Decembrist conspiracy in 1825 after the death of Alexander I, and paid for it on the scaffold or amid the snows of Siberia. But from 1825 the cleavage between the government and the thoughtful section of society, once opened, was never bridged again.

This mutual hostility first became acute during the reign of Nicholas I from 1825 to the Crimean War. The Decembrist conspiracy had revealed that the turn to the right by Alexander I after 1815 had created great bitterness. The same judicial and administrative abuses that marred Catherine's reign were still rampant, state finances were disordered, and the peasants were rudely exploited. Nicholas at first had some notion of reform, but his suspicion of extragovernmental initiative was such that he hesitated to take any concrete step. The most pressing problem was serfdom: the landlords were heavily in debt and short of capital to provide employment for a rapidly increasing peasant population. Peasant disorders were menacingly frequent, but only in the western Ukraine and in Poland were reforms introduced. Educational institutions were fettered and

PREFACE

• 178⁴²*
 FEW Westerners, even in the ranks of the cultured, have a precise notion of the historical meaning of the expression 'Slav solidarity'. To most of them, under the influence of pre-war German ideas, it suggests a phenomenon of racial nationalism, tinged with Orientalism.

Yet the idea of Slav solidarity was born, not in Russia, as we are tempted to suppose, but among the oppressed Slav peoples, Catholics by religion. It appeared for the first time in *Osman*, the epic written by the Croatian poet, Ivan Gondoulich, then in the work of his compatriot, Juraj Krizanich, a Catholic priest. It was then invoked in appealing for help with a view to emancipating the Slavs who were still under a foreign yoke: Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Bulgars. (These Slavs were, at the same time, the ones farthest removed from Russia.)

It was only intermittently that the Poles were to be affected by the Slavonic idea, which was to be definitely adopted by the Czechs as soon as they realised that separation from Austria was an essential condition for full national independence.

As for Russia, she used Slav solidarity as a diplomatic card against Turkey, and against Habsburg Austria. She emphasised or brushed aside its manifestations, to suit the changing international situation.

[162] So, in the perspective of history, this solidarity expresses less a racial *mystique* than the feeling of a common misfortune; while the idea of a community of ethnical origin gave it subconscious strength in the eyes of the masses, its value for the *élite* was, for long, only secondary. The conception of a common Slav culture, that of a large State comprising all the Slav peoples, was never envisaged, except by a few visionaries. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that a deep gulf of history and civilisation separated the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, and Slovenes—all Catholics, all steeped in Greco-Latin culture, from the Orthodox Slavs: Russians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgars. Among the first of these, Russian influence was limited to that of her literature—which, moreover, enjoyed no more popularity

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than that of France, Germany or England. And even the Serbs and Bulgars, while they were affected by Russian influence, yet preferred to go to Western Europe in quest of models for their civilisation and institutions.

Moreover, when their political interests were at variance, the Slavs did not hesitate to make war on each other. Not until the last World War were they to be found in the same camp, during a European conflagration.

That was what gave the Soviet Union an ideal pretext for posing as the animator and leader of Slav solidarity—considered, not as an end in itself, but as the means of creating, in the Slav masses, a wave of feeling favourable to Russian imperialism.

Whilst reviving historical memories well calculated to exalt Russian patriotism, the Moscow Government organised Slav congresses, with united resistance to German oppression as their chief theme: upon the Soviet Union had devolved the role of liberator of the Slavs.

That, again, was only a diplomatic move. Panslav propaganda was the rule from 1942 to 1945. Then Moscow perceived the danger attendant on maintaining a scale of preferential treatment among the various peoples placed under Soviet influence—some of which, such as Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Germany had, in the course of their history, lived in a state of permanent hostility to the Slavs. 'Panslav' slogans disappeared from official oratory. And the 'Titoist' diversion, setting Belgrade in opposition both to Moscow and to Sofia, once more broke Slav solidarity.

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With the exception of Poland, all the Slav peoples had desired greatness for Russia, but within certain limits: that of their own independence. When, from being a liberator, Russia became a dominator, the notion of Slav solidarity was purged of its political content, and the ties binding the countries of Eastern Europe to Moscow then depended entirely on Marx-Leninist unity.

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The Slav peoples saw the Russians at work in their own countries, replacing the *mystique* of emancipation by a policy of assimilation and force. The progress of 'Titoism' in Bulgaria and in Czechoslovakia is really nothing but a manifestation of the old Slav individualism, rising once more against imperialist hegemonies.

Chapter One

SLAVISM MENACES THE WEST

• 178 THE collapse of Germany inaugurated a revolutionary era in Europe. In the political domain, it was the prelude to transfers of strength whose full consequences cannot yet be gauged, although we can say definitely that it is the Slavs—and primarily the Russians—who will benefit by them.

[162] In this connection, the war has simply hastened a process to which a relentless impulse had already been given by the demographic rhythm of modern Europe. To-day, out of every three Europeans, one is a Slav. In three-quarters of a century from now, with the differing birth-rates in Western and in Eastern Europe, we shall find this ratio reversed.

563 On the eve of the war, our continent had 454,400,000 inhabitants. The Slavs numbered 145,072,000, distributed as follows: Poland, 27,181,000; Czechoslovakia, 13,611,000; Yugoslavia, 12,017,000; Bulgaria (a Slavified rather than a Slav country), 6,080,000; Great Russia, 55,548,000; Little Russia, 27,664,000; White Russia, 4,204,000.¹ It should be mentioned, in passing, that Russia, which common opinion (by metonymy) considers as the 'Slav country' *par excellence*, is on the contrary the only one which, within its State frontiers, includes at least an equal proportion of inhabitants of other races. For this reason it is also, whatever its political structure, the country where the national problem is at least easily reducible to a concept of ethnical homogeneity. It is as well not to forget this.

As far as any biological factor can do so, this prospect of demographic superiority in Europe gives stability and solidity to the political advantages which the Slavonic world may derive from the collapse of its age-long enemy—Germanism.

563 We shall use the term 'Slavonic world' or 'Slavonic community', rather than 'Slavonic race'. It was at the time when
829 science was abandoning its convictions regarding race-discrimina-

[161] ¹ Between 1930 and 1939 the population of Russia rose from 158 to 198 million, i.e. an annual increase of 3,700,000 persons—which constitutes a world record.

Chapter Two

RUSSIA AS THE PROTECTOR OF THE SLAVS, OR THE MYTH OF PANSLAVISM

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IN a Latin treatise, published in 1826 and devoted to the universal Slav language, the Slovak writer, Herkel, uses the expression, 'verus panslavismus'. He was the father of a word which, taken in a political sense, was destined, after 1848, to ring through the world.

If the word was new, what it denoted was old. The notion of Slav solidarity, implying a more or less organic plan for union among Slavs, progressed for three centuries along the paths of philology and literature. It was originated by a poet, the Ragusan Ivan Gondoulich (1588-1638), author of *Osman*, an epic poem in the style of Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered*. He formulated the idea of mutual assistance among Slavs, with a view to the redemption of the Turk-oppressed race, by singing the victories of Prince Ladislav, the future Ladislav IV, who routed the infidels on the banks of the Dniestr. It was a hymn of gratitude and hope, offered up by the Catholic Slavs of the Adriatic coasts, and addressed to Poland after her ephemeral successes.

Shortly after Gondoulich, a Catholic priest of Croatia, Youraj Krijanich (1618-1683), spoke in burning accents of the 'Slavonic nation'; his work, a mixture of linguistics, history and politics, bears traces of exalted intellectual and sentimental emotions, influenced perhaps, in a confused way, by memories of Byzantium. In Krijanich is shown, for the first time, a clear consciousness, developed beyond the limits of a poetic formula, of the unity of the Slavonic race. Turning no longer towards Poland, but towards Russia, he had a prophetic conception of that country's rôle as a consolidating factor for Slav energies.

[198] Krijanich, a Croat, a Papist and a Russophile, expressed himself in a strange dialect—a mixture of Croatian, Russian, and Palcoslav—in the hope of creating an idiom of intellectual solidarity for use among all Slavs, whom he called 'our people'. The result is that we are uncertain whether to class him with Russian or with Croatian literature. Whereas Gondoulich saw

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

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no oppressor of the Slavonic race other than the Turk, Krijanich added the German. He was the ancestor of the Russian Slavophiles of the nineteenth century. He was completely out of harmony with his age, which could not understand an argument combining the Slavonic idea with Roman Uniatism. He met the usual fate of a precursor. Having offered his services as Librarian to the Czar Alexis Mikailovitch, he obtained from Moscow a mission to reform Russian spelling; the manuscript of this work was recovered at Tver in 1888. But it was not long before he was suspected of being a Papist agent, and was deported to Siberia, in circumstances which have never been cleared up. At Tobolsk he drew up a treatise on 'Politics' which, on the lines of Machiavelli's work, was intended to deduce, from the principles of good and evil, the laws of the art of government. Was Peter the Great acquainted with this treatise, and was he influenced by it? Unfortunately, that is a matter which scholarship has not yet been able to decide. After that we lose trace of Krijanich. A Dutch traveller relates that a monk of that name died under the walls of Vienna, in the ranks of Sobieski's army; such would seem to be the crowning adventure of that strange visionary, promoter of a doctrine which was to be revived two hundred years later by a pleiad of thinkers and scholars and which, freed of its denominational utopianism, will remain the 'credo' of the apostles of Slav solidarity.

After the capture of Azov from the Turks by Peter the Great in 1696, the centre of gravity of Slavonic hopes was fixed in Russia. If we exclude the Polish point of view, it remained there for more than two centuries. The three reigns of Peter the Great, Catherine II, and Alexander I, helped to awaken the Russian national conscience by contact with the Slavs of the Balkans, Austria, and Hungary. This contact set up currents of mutual influence between sister-nations, discovering each other after long centuries of isolation and mutual ignorance. A Serbian Academician, M. Stoyanovich, published a series of testimonies from Serbs who were contemporaries of Peter the Great, from which it appears that, from this time onwards, the Southern Slavs considered Russian successes as their own.

Readers will not be surprised at the omission here of any reference to the 'Will of Peter the Great', which the Chevalier d'Eon, of dubious reputation, was said to have brought from

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The World of the Slavs

186* Russia to the Court of Versailles. This belongs to the prolific family of apocryphal documents in which the presumed projects of deceased monarchs have found an imaginary embodiment. But this forgery has often been invoked as an argument in favour of the existence of 'Panslavism'. Now, it does contain a programme of Russian expansion, and allusions to the Balkan Christians, but nothing more specifically affecting the Slavs. Which proves, at the very least, that his own contemporaries did not regard the founder of Modern Russia as the instigator of a policy of Slav solidarity.

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648 Under Catharine, every war against the Ottoman Empire was the occasion of levies of Slav contingents. After the failure of their risings, large bodies of Slavs took refuge in the South of Russia, where vast districts were allotted to them. During the Napoleonic wars, Admiral Seniavin's fleet, at the Cattaro Delta, assisted the combined Montenegrins and Serbs. But, at the Congress of Vienna, a failure on the part of Russian diplomacy caused the Cattaro Delta to be handed back to the Austrians. It was alleged that Alexander I had agreed to this betrayal of the Slavs, as the price of a night spent with the beautiful Madame de Metternich. Notwithstanding, Suvorov's victories prepared the way for the Serbian insurrection; when this broke out, the Russian general, O'Rurck, joined Karageorge, to beat the Turkish army at Varvarino, to the north of Nish.

Up to the nineteenth century, the Empire of the Tsars remained aloof from the European concert. When it did join in, through the expedient of the Holy Alliance, it espoused interests which were not its own, and for which, moreover, it showed little concern, by backing up the Balkan risings. In this way it tried its utmost to sponsor solidarity among the absolutist régimes, while at the same time supporting the Orthodox minorities.

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814 But the movement whose watchword was defence of 'brothers in race', did not arise in official circles. It was a creation of the 'intelligentsia'. It received its first impetus from the immense work of the German historical school in the second third of the nineteenth century. 'Sanctus amor patriae dat animum', the epigraph to the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, inspired Chafarik's *Slavonic Antiquities* in 1837, and Palatsky's *History of Bohemia*. The Slavs threw themselves passionately into these

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

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studies, and allowed themselves to be infected with that racial pride which German science displayed, with a tremendous orgy of texts and compilations.

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Kollár, a Slovak, Koukouljevich, a Croat, Kopitar and Stanko Vraz, two Slovenes, with Vuk Karadžich, a Serb, formed the pleiad of romantic scholars and men of letters who revealed to the Slav peoples the common basis of their culture and their traditions. Their scientific offensive, which Renan was to call, somewhat disdainfully, 'Comparative Philology transplanted to the political domain', was the prelude to an era of ferment, when far-seeing minds could foretell the catastrophe which would abolish the work of the Congress of Vienna. Never had pure learning let loose such a storm. It was destined to pile up, under the throne of the Habsburgs, the explosive forces whose work of destruction has been completed under our eyes.

The movement was precipitated by the recrudescence of racial antagonism in Hungary. The 1848 Revolution had scattered powder-trails throughout Europe. Austria-Hungary found herself, in the years that followed, a prey to two opposing currents, representing the different life-aspirations, rather than political conceptions, of two enemy groups among the nations of this heterogeneous Empire. While the Liberals of Vienna, in revolt against absolute power, marched in unison with the Frankfurt Parliament, and included in their ranks the Germans of Austria; while the Magyar Liberals broke with the Habsburgs and bore Kossuth to power, the Slavs of Cis-Leithania and Trans-Leithania, by a repercussion natural to oppressed races, rebelled against tendencies aiming at the strengthening of the two hegemonies, Germanic and Magyar. The ethnical crisis attained its peak in Hungary, where the Croats marched to the defence of the throne under the leadership of the Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, while the Slavs of Hungary (Slovaks and Serbs) kicked against the persecutions of a régime which Western journalism confused with Parliamentary Liberalism. Russia intervened in 1849 not only, as was long believed, to save the monarchical principle, but also under moral obligation not to let the Slavs of Hungary succumb. By the victory of Vilagos, the Russian armies restored to the Habsburgs Hungary, which they were on the point of losing. Six years later Austria, by her anti-Russian attitude in the Crimean War, was, according to a famous

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575 volunteers was armed and sent to Serbia a year before Russia's declaration of war, which was not made until April, 1877.

In the other Slavonic countries, the movement borrowed an ever-increasing offensive power from the general upward thrust of the nationalities. While the Czech deputies refused to sit in the Cis-Leithan Parliament, the Slovenes claimed the rights of their race and their language; the Croats, under the leadership of Mgr. Strossmayer, made of Zagreb a centre of national culture; the Serbs completed their emancipation and the Bulgarians, in two stages (1860 and 1870), secured the creation of the Exarchate. The Slavonic world was in full effervescence. Germanism grew alarmed. 'If necessary, we will put the Slavs up against the wall', Chancellor de Beust had said.

[648] The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was to some extent the military epilogue of this period of effervescence. The Congress of Berlin supplied Bismarck and Lord Beaconsfield with the opportunity of repressing the outbursts of the Slavonic race, and of checkmating ethnical propaganda, under colour of ensuring European peace.

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• 178 During the years that followed, the interest taken by Russia in the Slavonic countries appeared to decrease. Internal affairs absorbed the attention of the Imperial Government, and the disappointments following the Congress of Berlin kept Russian society of the time of Alexander III in a mood of weariness or of apathy. This disaffection became more marked at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas II. Whilst Europe saw Panslavism as a volcano for ever in eruption, Tsarist diplomacy kept in quarantine the heirs of Slavophile thought. The word *bratouchka* (little brother), coined in 1877, at the time of the liberation of Bulgaria, lost its touching significance, to become a scornful term, synonymous with 'cadger', applied to the Balkan Slavs. German influence, exercised in St. Petersburg by the Baltic barons and the Court, took advantage of the repugnance felt by Liberalism and the Western type of Intellectualism to a movement which claimed to bring the country back to the real sources of its tradition.

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668 The Slavonic Congress held in St. Petersburg in May, 1908, was attended by members of the Duma, of *Kolo Polsko* (Polish

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs 31

Thus, at the beginning of this century, the Slavonic idea had permeated all the currents of spiritual life of the nations whose historic personality it exalted. In Russia, after having arisen among the intellectual *élite*, it had been relegated to the rank of diplomatic accessories. But it had been rejuvenated by allying itself with Czech Agnosticism, with Croatian and Slovene Catholicism, with the positive sense of the Bulgars, the legendary spirit of independence of the Serbs. It had been an aspect, a 'phase' of the march of the nationalities towards emancipation. From the minutes of meetings of learned societies, it had advanced to the domain of direct action. After having taken stock (academically) of the injustices which formed landmarks in the history of the Slavonic world, it was preparing to achieve reparation for these injustices by conspiracies, acts of violence, war. 186
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While Russia had given the emotional impetus to this movement, and the Czechs had demonstrated the educative elements in a Slavonic science and conscience, it was left to the Yugoslavs to set the ruthless pace which was to precipitate events. It was under their influence that Slavism entered upon its revolutionary phase. In Hungary it found the oppressive atmosphere which provoked this evolution; the beginning of the twentieth century is marked, in Croatia, by a series of trials and acts of violence which revealed to the world the progress of Yugoslav militancy. It was in fact in Bosnia, from a centre of Yugoslav irredentism, that sprang the spark which was to set the continent afire. Starting from the speculative heights of the learned world, the Slavonic idea culminated in shots, fired point blank, by a Herzegovine student, at the heir to the Austrian Empire, in a Sarajevo street. When the President of the Tribunal interrogated the authors of the crime as to the motives for their action, they repeated, with dogged fatalism, 'Francis Ferdinand was the enemy of the Slavs'.

Russian officialdom took fright at this effervescence. It sought excuses for its passive attitude. To explain why they had abandoned the Serbs at the time of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stolypin stated that Imperial diplomacy had simply had an eye to the future. 'Give the peasants of Kostroma ten more years at the plough'. A second humiliation was inflicted on Russia in April, 1913, when, to please Austria, she 186*
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The Triumph of the Nationalities

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be sought in the most remote centuries, in the contact of the Slavs 829
 with the Turanian peoples of the Steppes, who were the founda- 167
 tion of the so-called 'Scythic' Iranian population. From time 181
 immemorial, the Turko-tartar peoples, by their pillaging raids,
 have borne heavily on the Iranians, their immediate neighbours,
 and, through them, on the Slavonic peoples. The Iranians have
 been the victims of the Turkomans of the salt Steppes—and the
 Slavs, by repercussion, have shared their fate. Having thus
 exhausted their political and social strength, they have become
 the chronic prey of the conquerors.

This thesis of an original curse, whatever its scientific value,
 should be borne in mind, for it justifies a conviction that is wide-
 spread among the Germans, *viz.*, the inferiority of the Slavonic
 race, and its presumed incapacity to develop from the notion of
 a clan to that of a State. There have been published anthologies
 of German thinkers and propagandists on this theme, which is
 summed up in the well-known witticism *Gute Nacht, Russen,*
nach Asien!—which the Germans have invoked, even down to
 our own times, to justify considering Eastern Europe merely as
 a contemptible suburb of Teutonism.

Such is the background of history on which was projected 829
 the 'reckoning' on which Bethmann-Hollweg and von Moltke 721
 had banked. Must we, however, go so far as to say that the War 178 •
 of 1914 was a Teuto-Slavonic war? M. Benes considers this
 thesis as attractive as it is untenable. He regards this war as a
 struggle between two political and philosophical conceptions,
 the logical development of the European evolution which, begin-
 ning at the Renaissance, culminated in the triumph of political
 individualism, of parliamentary and constitutional law. The
 war, he says, was not Teuto-Slavonic in character, nor in aims,
 nor in results.

Limited to the strict sequence of facts, this judgement is
 admissible. While Austria-Hungary threw herself into the war to
 prevent a rupture of her interior balance to the advantage of
 the Slavs, deeper and more decisive causes armed the Great
 Powers one against the other.

If, however, we consider the atmosphere that reigned in 186*
 Europe in 1914, when the war found so many inflammable 721
 substances in a state of suspense, M. Benes's point of view seems
 more contestable. The interests of the Slavs were neither

Chapter Five

RUSSIA AS ARBITER OF THE SLAVONIC NATIONS

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• 178 **I**N the conditions under which it was realised, the liberation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet armies radically transformed the factors in the Slavonic problem. All the aims that the feeling of historical and racial solidarity had assigned to the Slavs were suddenly outstripped.

The First World War had resulted in their emancipation. As we have pointed out, this emancipation was due no less to the collapse of Tsarist Russia than to the victory of the Western Democracies. It had 'set up a home' for the Slavonic nations, free of mortgage on their national sovereign rights, without predominance of any one nation over the others. The two tasks imposed on them had been, on the one hand, the creation of inter-Slav ties—political, economic, and spiritual—on the other, a reorganisation of their relations with Russia.

The first of these tasks had been but imperfectly realised. The evolution of the international situation between the two wars was calculated rather to dissociate than to regroup the energies of the Slavonic world. And once again in history the Second World War had found the Slavonic nations in opposing camps.

As for relations with Moscow, they were diffident and inconsistent; where they did issue in positive agreements, these were hedged with cautious circumlocutions, and lacked a well-defined scope.

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With the liberation, and the presence of the Red armies on their territory, the Slavonic peoples glimpsed a plan of their international life which was very different from the one they had known between 1919 and 1940. The new Governments had been formed under the eyes of the Liberator and, in the majority of cases, from elements devoted to the Soviet ideology. Under colour of 'anti-Fascism' a tidal wave swept away the old groups, accused of having, before or during the war, supported Axis designs. In reality the 'purge' marked an operation of a revolutionary nature, characterised by the rise to power of the

Slav Solidarity Breaks Up

197

Congregation of the Holy Office, forbidding the publication and diffusion of Communist doctrine.

So the *Kulturkampf* was waged, now energetically, now quietly. The Prague Government was accused by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, of violating 'human dignity and civilisation'; once more the conflict passed from the national to the international level, symbolising the ideological antagonism which exists between the Soviet world and the Western democracies. Neither the Government nor the clergy showed any signs of weakening. On November 17 the bishops again asked the civil power to abandon the laws relating to religious teaching, as conceived by the State, and the interference of lay authorities in the nomination of priests and the administration of Church property.

The end of the year 1949 was marked by waves of purges in Communist circles, and by fresh trials on charges of treason, incriminating, like those of Budapest and Sofia, Tito's 'agents' or 'accomplices'.

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During this period politics in Poland were somewhat less sensational than in the other Slav countries. There again, however, the régime of 'popular democracy' evolved in the direction of Stalin-Marxism. The struggle against the Church was less open, and did not, as in Czechoslovakia, go to the length of making the clergy civil servants. The Government concentrated its efforts particularly on increasing exports, on economic reconstruction, and on exploiting the German lands brought under its control—and these efforts, it must be admitted, were attended with remarkable results.

The German Question was its chief external problem; in its view, it was France's policy in respect of the Reich which prevented the renewal of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance. What Warsaw particularly feared was lest a change of attitude on the part of the Allies towards Germany should reopen the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the Poles considered sacrosanct, but which transferred to them territories whose final allocation was, legally, postponed until the making of the peace treaty for the Reich.

The most sensational event was the nomination (on November 7) of Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal (of Polish

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EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

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ern world. The Slavs, organized around the holy Orthodox faith and under the leadership of Russian autocracy, based on the strong foundations of the Russian land community, would become a powerful political organization strong enough to bring the Western world to the Russian pale.

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Here we are already in the center of the Russian Panslavistic doctrine. And this is, by the way, the picture of the whole Hegelian road of the Slavophil philosophy of history: thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. Chicherin in his profoundly interesting memoirs, mocking the Slavophiles and especially Constantine Aksakov, says: "He (Aksakov) conceived Russian history according to all the rules of Hegel's logic; the old Russia represented the statement, the new—the negation, and the future announced by the Slavophiles was to be the restoration in a superior form of the original statement. This formula could be successfully applied perhaps only to the beard: the beard existed in old Russia, in the new it was shaved, in the future it would be restored."¹¹

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As long as the Slavophiles were busy with their national costumes, traditions, orthodox theology, and glorification of the Russian past, they might be considered more or less independent, distinguished, and inoffensive satellites or offshoots of the official national ideology—but satellites and offshoots who confined themselves to the worship of what they considered Russian national traditions. But when they extended their love to other people and their hatred embraced not only Peter the Great but the West, they became involved in political problems. And at this point some of them degenerated into Panslavism; besides, some new adherents, acting in the purely political field, joined the Slavophil group. Here again we must take into consideration certain other sources of influence and tradition—this time purely political.

Some of the political conceptions adopted by the Slavophiles appeared earlier—even at the time of Peter the Great and Elizabeth. From time to time conceptions of the liberation of the "Slavic brothers" emerged, but they developed especially strongly,

¹¹ *Vospominaniya* B. N. Chicherina, Moscow, 1926, p. 236.

PANSLAVISM

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section dealt with the "occupied countries" and came partly under the jurisdiction of the Bureau and partly under that of the Committee for Active Struggle Against Fascism. In 1942 the All-Slav Committee's budget amounted to 320,000,000 roubles, in 1943 to 400 million, and in 1944, when the financial division had ceased to come under the control of the Secretariate, the Committee's budget had risen to 550 million roubles. The All-Slav Congress which took place recently in Belgrade has afforded some indications of the place which the All-Slav Committee holds in Russia's post-war political propaganda apparatus. The main speech of the Soviet delegate, General Gundorov, was an invitation to the Slav peoples to ignore "the sinister forces of world reaction" and submit to Communist guidance. Two resolutions¹⁸⁶ passed by the Belgrade Congress deserve attention. The first, which makes Belgrade the center of the All-Slav Committee and Maslavitch its chairman, is an indication of the importance attached in Soviet policy to Slav sentiment in the Balkans, where to some extent it is a substitute for nationalist sentiment. The second resolution provides for the participation in the work of the All-Slav Committee of representatives of "the largest progressive Slav organization from non-Slav countries, with the right to an advisory vote."⁵⁷⁵ ⁶⁶⁸ [56]

In order not to be misunderstood I feel it necessary to stress that in spite of some striking parallelisms in the use of Panslavic conceptions by Soviet foreign policy and by the Russian tsarist government, the differences remain enormous—but not at all in the sense of Mr. Leonidov's views. As I mentioned before, the Russian tsarist government of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound by international and public law; and because of this the fate of the Russian subject of those times cannot be compared to the fate of the modern Russian citizen. Russia was not hidden behind an iron curtain from the world, and foreign travelers could visit Russia and freely observe her life: Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Russians were sent to Siberia, but tsarist Russia did not know concentration camps; and the conditions of

● 178 the exiles in Siberia during the time of the tsars could not be compared to the atrocious conditions reigning in Soviet concentration camps. Besides, the number of people sent to Siberia by the tsars during a whole century never reached even the smallest portion of the number deported by Stalin in one year. The tsars sent individuals there; Stalin transfers whole nations. Finally, one has to remember that free speech was not completely non-existent in tsarist Russia; the Panslavistic doctrines could be and were discussed—and even criticised. Nothing like that, of course, is possible under the Soviet regime. It happened that during the tsarist period Russia realized her greatest achievements in every field of her life. From Pushkin to Tolstoy, from Glinka to Rimsky-Korsakov, from Levitsky to Repin, from Lomonosov to Mechnikov one has pleiads of Russian men who created the great Russian culture and its prestige. Therefore, at that time Russia might indeed represent a spiritual attraction. People realized that Panslavism did not mean exactly Tolstoy and Rimsky-Korsakov but rather a Russian gendarme. This is why Engels wrote that behind the Panslavic conceptions “stands the terrible reality of the Russian Empire.” But still the power of suggestion and attraction, to say the least, of the great Russian writers was a concrete fact, and even Russian Emperors like Alexander I, Nicholas I, and Alexander II were not deprived of traits which might captivate Europeans.

300 How different is the present situation! Where are the great spiritual achievements of Soviet culture? Even if one admits that there is a Soviet literature, that there is a Soviet science, that there is a Soviet music, what would these achievements mean without the background of the great Russian nineteenth century, and what do they mean in comparison with it? What are the promises and gifts which modern Russia would be able to offer to the Slavs, to mankind? What kind of reality “stands” behind Soviet Panslavism?

When one reads the horrifying, really monstrous reports on the abysmal sufferings and tortures which entire nations are en-